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28 April 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Memos and Papers Being Prepared on Vietnam

I. By the Office of National Estimates

1. Chinese attitudes towards the Vietnamese war, including comments on GVN/allied successes China could tolerate in the south and in the north.
2. Soviet attitudes towards the Vietnamese war, including GVN/allied successes the USSR could tolerate in the south and in the north.
3. The international state of mind on Vietnam.
4. Probable North Vietnamese, Russian, Chinese, South Vietnamese and other countries' reactions to a major increase over the next two years in U.S. force strength and in the scope of U.S. military action.
5. Probable North Vietnamese, Russian, Chinese, South Vietnamese and other countries' reactions to a continuation over the next two years of present U.S. military policies conducted with approximately present force levels.

II. By the Office of Current Intelligence

1. North Vietnamese (Communist) political capabilities in the non-Communist world.
2. North Vietnam: (1) Motivation and intentions, (2) GVN/allied successes Hanoi would tolerate in the south, (3) GVN/allied successes Hanoi would permit on North Vietnamese territory.

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3. Effect of the bombing on North Vietnamese thinking, particularly in regard to negotiations.

III. By the Office of Research and Reports

1. An analysis of South Vietnam's economy.
2. An analysis of North Vietnam's economy.
3. Effectiveness of our aerial operations against North Vietnam and of the enemy efforts to combat and compensate for them.

IV. By [REDACTED] 25X1A

An assessment of the intelligence attack on the VC infrastructure.

V. By the Vietnamese Affairs Staff

1. An analysis of the military situation in South Vietnam.
2. An analysis of pacification.
3. An analysis of political developments and prospects in South Vietnam.
4. Communist order of battle, including comments on unit effectiveness, infiltration, recruitment and losses.
5. State of the Viet Cong infrastructure.

Officers charged with primary responsibility for individual papers will, of course, consult with their colleagues in the other components.

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Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

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